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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------M. ELAINE BROWN,
PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.

Case No. 15,638

WENDELL V. MILLER,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a Judgment of the Fourth
Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah,
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, presiding.

RICHARD D. BRADFORD
P.O. Box 432
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Appellant
RICHARD S. DALEBOUT
60 East 100 South, Suite 100
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

M. ELAINE BROWN,
PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.

Case No. 15,638

WENDELL V. MILLER,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff sued the defendant on a
promissory note, and. the defendant counterclaimed to
have the entire transaction set aside and his down
payment returned to him.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried before the Honorable
J. Robert Bullock in the Fourth Judicial District Court
for Utah County, State of Utah, sitting without a jury.
The Court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff
on the theory of caveat emptore and entered judgment
for respondent, with costs and attorney's fees.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that the alleged contract
sued upon was totally devoid of consideration and
therefore the transaction should be set aside.

The

promissory note should be voided, and the appellant
should have judgment against the respondents for the
$3, 750.00 down payment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April, 1977, the plaintiff offered to sell
the defendant for $7,500.00 a "business" that she had
started six months previously.

The "business" consisted

of buying restaurant supplies such as food, paper products and chemicals from wholesale houses in Salt Lake
City, Utah, and reselling them to restaurants and
diners in Price, Utah.
Mr. Miller, the defendant, paid $3, 7 50. 00 cash
down payment and a like amount in the form of a
promissory note.

In the course of the transaction,

there was an earnest money agreement and a promissory
note, but there never was an:y writ ten contract defining
the rights of the parties.
The plaintiff operated the business from her
· Provo, Uta h , un d er t h e name "L.D. 's Fi"ne Foods."
h ome in
The plaintiff requested that the defendant use a
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

different name when he started selling in Price.
(Record at 14.)

There were no assets involved in the

sale: no delivery vehicles, no inventory, no accounts
receivable.

The only thing allegedly transferred in

the sale was the supposed "good will" of the business.
(Record at 32 - 33.)
Both parties sued -- Mrs. Brown to enforce
payment of the promissory note and Mr. Miller to void
the contract and have his down payment returned.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

A CONTRACT MUST BE SUPPORTED
BY CONSIDERATION TO BE VALID
AND LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE.
The above statement is basic contract law
needing no supporting citations.

Reference to

17 C.J.S. Contracts Section 71 will provide ample
authorities.

It is treated briefly here merely because

it is the major premise of a syllogism herein.

The

minor premise, to be treated in Point II, is that there
was no consideration in this case; the conclusion is
that the transaction should be set aside.
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 75,
defines consideration as follows:
Consideration for a promise is
(a)

An act other than a promise, or

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(b)

A forbearance, or

(c)

The creation, modification or destruction
of a legal relation, or

(d)

A return promise,

bargained for and given in exchange for the
promise.
We must examine this case to see if the plaintiff
gave anything that would qualify as consideration in
return for the defendant's $7,500.00.

If she did not,

then the contract is not legally enforceable and the
$7,500.00 must be returned to the defendant.

See

General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero
Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976).
POINT II
THE ONLY CONSIDERATION
ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF
WAS "GOOD WILL," YET THERE
WAS NO GOOD WILL TO BE
TRANSFERRED HERE.
"Good will" is a term of art in the law.

It

is used to refer to a somewhat ethereal quality -- the
likelihood that customers will patronize a particular
business.

The elements that constitute good will have

been delineated by the courts.

In Vercimak v. Ostoi.£!:,

118 Utah 253, 221 P.2d 602 (1950), this Court stated

.

that "one of the elements in good will is continuity
place."

221 P.2d at 604.
-4-
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The chief elements of good will are
continuity of time and continuity of
place. Good will means an established
business at a given place with the
patronage that attaches to the name and
location. Avery v. Lyons, 331 P.2d 906,
(Kan. 1958).
"A firm or trade name is re?,arded as inseparable
from good will."

O'Hara v. Lance,

267 P.2d 725 (Ariz.

1954.)
"Good will has no existence as property in and
of itself but is an incident of a continuing business
having locality or name."

Lerner v. Stone, 252 P.2d

5 2 2 (Co 1 o . 19 5 2) .

The only thing the plaintiff claims to have
sold is the "good will" of the business.

The deposition

of Larry Brown, who is the plaintiff's husband and has
served as advisor' and counselor to her (and with whom
the defendant primarily

dealt in the sale), is quoted

as follows:
Question: Did the $7,500.00 figure include
any inventory?
Answer:

No.

Question: Did it include any accounts
receivable?
Answer:

No.

Question: Did it include any tangible property
of any kind?
Answer:

The good will of the business.

-5-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Question: Did it include any tangible products
of any kind?
Answer:

No.

(Deposition of Larry Brown at

5 - 6.)

The plaintiff reiterated this fact in her
testimony at trial.

(Record at 32 - 33.)

At the request of the plaintiff, Mr. Miller
did not use the name of L.D. 's Fine Foods, although he
desired to do so.

(Record at 14.)

The plaintiff conducted a "business" out of
her home for less than six months under a name that was
not transferred in the sale.
carried the firm name.

There was no product that

The plaintiff did not agree to

forbear from competing with Mr. Miller after the sale.
Therefore, it cannot be said that there was transferred
any continuity of time, location or name; hence, there
was no good will and no consideration.
POINT III
EVEN IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY GOOD
WILL TO SELL, IT COULD NOT BE
BARGAINED AND SOLD INDEPENDENTLY.
Courts of law and taxation authorities have
struggled with the concept of good will.

Out of this

struggle have grown several time-honored doctrines
governing the sale or disposition of good will.
of the cardinal rules is that good will has no
existence as property in and of itself but is an
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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incident of a continuing business having locality or
name.

Lerner v. Stone, supra.
In a case dealing with this issue the Utah

S~preme

Court elaborated on this principle.

In

Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966),
this Court stated:
Good will is property, so recognized
and protected by law. As such it is subject
to bargain and sale. There has been a
rather general acceptance by the courts
that good will exists as property
incidentally to other property rights
and is not susceptible of being owned
and disposed of separately from property
rights to which it is an incident.
[Citations omitted.]

It has been repeatedly held that
there can be no "good will" so-called, of
a business which depends for its existence
upon the professional qualities of the
persons who carry it on.
SUMMARY

The plaintiff supposedly sold a "business"
to Wendell Miller. the appellant, for $7,500.00.
reality, Mr. Miller got nothing.

In

The only thing

allegedly sold was the "good will of the business,"
which was nonexistent in the first place, and which
can't be sold in and of itself in the second place.
Since there never was any consideration, and hence no
valid contract, Mr. Miller should have his money

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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restored to him, and his note cancelled.
I\" -ti~
Respectfully submitted this ,.)__________ day of
April, 1978.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed

copies of the foregoing

Appellant's Brief to Richard S. Dalebout, 60 East 100
South, Suite 100, Provo, Utah 84601, this

_Jr/..

of April, 1978, first class postage prepaid.
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